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Typically, studies of mutual fund performance use monthly return data without controlling for the issue of stale pricing, an inequality between the current price of fund shares and the current value of the underlying assets. This discrepancy occurs when the share price set by funds at the end of each day fails to reflect the most current market information on these assets, because the underlying securities are thinly traded or traded in a different time zone. In funds with stale pricing, observed returns differ from true returns. Scholes and William (1977) show that when data are nonsynchronous, estimates of beta and alpha are biased and inconsistent. In addition, stale prices in mutual fund shares create arbitrage opportunities for short-term traders who purchase shares when the fund's net asset value (NAV) is lower than the value of the underlying securities and sell shares after the true value is incorporated into the NAV. The round trip transactions can be as quick as overnight. Chalmers, Edelen, and Kadlec (2001) call such opportunity a "wild card" option. Greene and Hodges (2002) and Bhargava, Bose, and Dubofsky (1998) provide evidence that arbitrageurs take advantage of such opportunities and their trades can dilute fund returns up to 0.5% annually. This paper develops a performance evaluation model that not only controls for nonsynchronicity in fund data but also considers the arbitrage dilution due to stale pricing. By directly measuring the statistical bias and dilution effect, the model evaluates managerial ability net of these effects. In contrast, performance evaluated using various traditional models is negatively influenced by stale pricing. As shown in this paper, for each one standard deviation increase in stale pricing, traditionally evaluated performance decreases by about 40 basis points. Compared to an average expense ratio of 0.78% for the sample funds, this magnitude is economically important.
This study contributes to two strands of literature: nonsynchronous data in the application of pricing models and performance dilution due to stale pricing arbitrage. As regards the former, Scholes and William (1976) introduce a model that estimates the beta of nonsynchronously traded stocks. Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) introduce an evaluation model of return smoothing in hedge funds. This paper contributes to such research in two ways. First, it develops a model that estimates mutual fund performance with serially correlated returns. Second, it controls for arbitrage dilution of fund performance. As regards to the second strand of literature, whereas the extant studies on stale pricing and arbitrage dilution draws inferences from the cross-sectional relation between flow and performance, analysis in this paper endogenizes the flow process by modeling the arbitrage timer's response to stale pricing. This endogenization allows estimation of the dilution effect and managerial ability simultaneously and directly from the performance evaluation model.
The model also delivers a method of fund performance decomposition, which is especially interesting for performance attribution studies and applications in the fund industry. The difference between the observed alpha and the true alpha is the sum of a statistical bias and the arbitrage dilution. According to the empirical evidence, the statistical bias is positive but has little economic significance, while the dilution effect is negative and significant at the 1% level for most fund style groups. Furthermore, this dilution effect increases with the fund stale pricing, with funds in the top quintile having an average dilution of 34 basis points annually and those in the lowest quintile, a dilution of only 7 basis points.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I introduces the model, Section II describes the data, and Section III presents the empirical results. Section IV then compares the alpha from the proposed model with those from various traditional models, and Section V presents robustness checks and discusses possible extensions of the model. Section VI concludes the paper.
I. The model
The model is defined in terms of stale pricing, the impact of fund flows, and the crucial element of market timing. The literature refers the term of market timing to two types of activity: in one, fund managers increase fund beta by changing portfolio holdings when they expect the market to go up (hereafter, market timing); in the other, daily timers trade in and out of funds frequently (arbitrage timing). This paper focuses only on arbitrage timing and refers to the arbitragers as daily timers.
A. Stale pricing
To address the return process with zero flows, the analysis assumes that the true return of the underlying assets follows a market model. However, nonsynchronous trading (Sholes and William 1977, Lo and MacKinlay 1990) and naïve methods for determining the fair market value or "marks" for underlying assets (Chalmers, Edelen, and Kadlec 2001, Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov 2004) yield serially correlated observed returns of the fund. Thus, assuming that information generated in time t is not fully incorporated into prices until one period later, 1 the observed return becomes a weighted average of true returns in the current and last periods:
r t * = η r t-1 +(1-η) r t (1b) where r t denotes the true excess return of the portfolio and r mt the excess market return.
Both r t and r mt are i.i.d, and the error term ε t is independent of r mt . r i,t * is the observed excess return of the portfolio with zero flows, while η is the weight on the lagged true return. That is, the higher the η, the more the staleness in the prices.
This form can be extended to a variety of more complicated models; for example, to estimate market timing ability by assuming cov(r t , r mt 2 ) is nonzero or to incorporate time-variant stale pricing by specifying the form taken by the parameter η. 2 In this paper, for simplicity, η is assumed to be constant over time.
B. The arbitrage timer's decision
When share prices are stale, the future return or a part of the future NAV of the fund is predictable. This predictability, combined with the option to trade at the NAV, allows active traders to capture price swings without bearing any risk when moving in and out of funds quickly. Nonetheless, the timer faces a choice between fund shares with return R p and risk-free assets with return R f, , where R p is the sum of r * (the excess return of fund shares) and r f . The timer maximizes a utility function that depends on the expected excess return conditional on observation of past fund returns:
1 This assumption can be verified empirically. In this paper, I apply Getmanky, Lo, and Makorov (2004) to mutual fund data and show that, on average, fund returns smooth over the current and one previous period (table IV-a). 2 Chen, Ferson, and Peters (2005) show that systematic stale pricing can cause a spurious component in timing measurement and the mean of observed fund returns.
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where x is the weight on fund shares in period t, and h is an exogenous benchmark preference parameter. The optimal weights on fund shares are given in equation (2b):
where γ is the Rubinstein (1973) measure of risk aversion, which is assumed here to be constant. The details of obtaining the weights are presented in appendix A1.
From equations (1a) 
To assess the fund's long-term flows, the model assumes that C t-1 is long-term flow occurring at the end of period t-1. This flow responds to past long-run returns and is uncorrelated with stale pricing or short-term return r t-1 . For simplicity, it follows an N(c,
Therefore, the fund flow at the end of period t-1 is
The difference between λ and γ results from the measurement of flows. Δx t-1 represents a percentage of the timer's total assets, while f t-1 represents a percentage of the fund's TNA.
C. The impact of fund flows
As Greene and Hodge (2002) show, daily flows by active mutual fund traders cause a dilution of returns, which results from the lag between the time that money comes in and the time that fund managers purchase risky assets. Edelen and Warner (2001) note that fund managers typically do not receive a report of the day's fund flow until the morning of the next trading day, by which time the prices of underlying risky assets have changed. For simplicity, this model assumes that the fund manager reacts immediately on seeing the flows so that the response lags by only one day.
The flow occurring at the end of the previous trading day is f t-1 = CF t-1 /(N t-1 P t-1 ),
where CF t-1 is the dollar amount of flows, N t-1 is the number of shares, and P t-1 is the observed share price, P t-1 = TNA t-1 /N t-1 . As noted earlier, r t * is the observed excess portfolio return with zero flows. Because of the lag in new money flow investment, the new money flow overnight leads only to a risk-free rate return:
and
The observed excess return with flows is denoted by r t 0 :
Through the detailed derivation given in appendix A2, it can be shown that r t 0 differs from r t * :
D. The system
The system is formulated using the following equations derived from equations (1a), (1b), (2d), (2e), and (3d), which define the model. The details are given in appendix A3. 
E. Components of performance and biases
In this paper, the true alpha or true performance is defined as the alpha estimated with true returns. The true alpha from the above model is 
If c is completely predictable, fund managers can avoid this dilution through certain cash budget arrangements; however, as shown by Edelen (1999) , the unexpected flows will dilute fund performance. Specifically, when c is zero, this bias is zero. 
II. Data
Both Lipper and Trimtab currently have datasets that claim to record daily fund flows. However, it is widely recognized that, whereas daily flow data should give a time series of daily mutual fund TNAs from which daily flows or the exact flows on a certain day can be computed; in fact, mutual funds have no accurate day-end TNA figure because they do not know how much flow has been received on the current day.
Therefore, some funds report TNA on day t including the current day's flows, some report it excluding day t flows, and some report a mixture that includes part but not all of day t flows. In addition, funds may report one way one day and another, the next. In other words, as argued by Edelen and Warner (2001) and Greene and Hodges (2002) , true daily flows may sometimes be lagged by one day, without it being clear when or for which funds. Furthermore, there is no way to check the daily data against another source because all fund databases suffer from this problem. The SEC's NSARs are required to include the current day's flow in day t TNA, but because they aggregate all share classes, this also cannot be merged with the other data. As a result, it is currently unfeasible to calculate the true day-by-day flows.
A second possibility is monthly return and flow data. In practice, all flows could be invested the next day, meaning that the actual amount that dilutes the monthly return is the aggregation of the dilution of days within the month. Modifying the monthly flow to a daily average flow for the month enables application of equation (3d) Fund flow, computed using fund TNA and returns, is the percentage change of total net assets after fund returns are controlled for:
Panel B of 
III. Empirical results
Overall, the empirical results indicate that the dilution effect is large, but the statistical bias due to stale pricing is small, and the true performance is free of biases due to stale pricing.
A. Moment conditions and estimations
The system (4a)- (4h) can be written into the following moment conditions for model estimation:
dividend yield = the annual dividend yield of the CRSP value-weighted stock index; inflation = the percentage change in the consumer price index, CPI-U; industrial production growth = the monthly growth rate of the seasonally adjusted industrial production index; short-term corporate illiquidity = the percentage spread of three-month high-grade commercial paper rates over three-month treasury rates; and stock market liquidity = the liquidity measure from Lubos and Stambaugh (2003), based on price reversals. 5 The style-matched benchmark portfolio is a weighted average return of the eight asset classes obtained by minimizing the tracking error between the fund returns (for all the funds of the same style) and the style benchmark. with average monthly style group flows and returns but also for individual funds with monthly fund flows and returns. The true alpha in equation (5a), the observed alpha in equation (5b), the statistical bias in equation (6a), and the dilution effects of long-term and short-term flows in equations (6b) and (6c) are all estimated.
B. Results for the style groups and individual funds (Insert table II here.)
Table II presents the estimation results by style groups for the style-group portfolios. Panel A presents the estimated parameters and their t-statistics; panel B presents the estimated alpha and beta and the biases. Here, the true alpha is on average positive but not significant. The spurious bias is small for the style portfolios, but the dilution effects of flows are significant. For example, the dilution effect for short-term flows is 38 basis points for small company growth funds, 18 for other aggressive growth, and 40 for sector funds.
(Insert figure A here.)
The model is also estimated for each individual fund. Figure A plots the empirical distributions of the t-statistics of the true alphas and the bias components for individual funds by style group. 6 According to these distributions, fund managers generally have no picking ability, and there is little spurious bias or dilution effects of long-term flows;
however, the dilution effect due to short-term flows is significant and widespread.
Moreover, not surprisingly, the dilutions, while mostly negative, are positive for some funds. This positivity may result, at least partly, from a net outflow causing the cash balance to shift downward or, in a downturn market, from the higher cash balance making the return look better.
C. Relations between stale pricing and biases, dilutions, and true alpha
(Insert table III here.) Table III however, the statistical bias is significantly larger in the top quintile than in the bottom quintile. Additionally, the dilution effect of arbitrage flows is larger (in a negative direction) in the top quintile than in other quintiles. Since the magnitude of the dilution effect is larger than that of the spurious bias, the observed alpha is therefore smaller in the top quintile. These results are consistent with the theoretical derivations that the statistical bias is linearly and positively related with stale pricing, whereas the dilution effect of arbitrage flows is linearly and negatively related with stale pricing. Most importantly, the true alpha is independent of stale pricing and flows.
IV. Comparison: Traditional performance measures and stale pricing
Now it has been shown that the alpha estimated with the proposed model is free of the bias caused by stale pricing, this section compares the proposed model with traditional models. The results suggest that the cross-sectional differences in conventional alphas are largely explained by stale pricing even after various fund characteristics have been controlled for.
A. Measures of performance and stale pricing
Fund performance is compared using six conventional alphas estimated by the following equations:
where r i,t is fund i's return in period t, r m,t is the market return, r s,t is the style benchmark return, and Z t-1 is the lagged economic instruments. In all, the analysis uses 11
instruments. The first four estimated alphas are Jensen's (1968) alpha and the conditional alpha of Ferson and Schadt (1996) estimated with a market benchmark and style benchmarks. 7 The fifth controls for Carhart's (1997) four factors, and the last for Pastor and Stambaugh's (1999) liquidity factor.
Four measures of stale pricing are also used. The first, introduced by Lo and MacKinlay (1990) , is designed for a nontrading scenario:
where r t o is the observed returns. The true return follows a one factor linear model in which μ i is the mean of the true return. In each period, security i has π i , the probability of nontrading; the larger the π, the staler the price. The detailed derivations of this measure are presented in appendix A6.
The second measure, the smooth index (Getmansky, Lo, and Makorov 2004) , is derived for thin trading scenarios in which trades are not deep enough to absorb all information:
where r t o is again the observed returns, and the true return follows a one factor linear model. It is then easy to show 1/(1+k) ≤ ξ ≤ 1. The wider the distribution of θ j, the smaller the ξ; the more concentrated the θ j, the larger the ξ. Indeed, Getmansky, Lo, and
Makorov (2004) show that smoothing increases the Sharpe ratio of the observed returns of hedge funds. The detailed derivations of this measure are given in appendix A7.
In addition to π and ξ, stale pricing can also be measured by the covariance beta of fund returns and lagged market returns or the autocovariance beta of fund returns:
Beta(r t , r t-1 ) = Cov(r t , r t-1 )/ Var(r)
where r is fund returns, r t is fund return in period t, r m is market return, and r m,t-1 is market return in period t-1.
(Insert table IV-a and table IV-b here.)
Table IV-a summarizes the estimated stale pricing by fund style. Less than half the funds display nontrading properties. Among the funds with π > 0, the probability of nontrading is as high as 0.5. The minimum smoothing index ξ is 0.17 for all style groups, implying that the return can smooth up to five periods, K = 5. The average smoothing index ξ is about 0.5, implying that prices on average smooth back only one period, K = 1.
Table IV-b presents the joint probability of a fund presenting stale pricing in period t and t + τ, τ = 1,2, --5 (which is similar to Makorov chains), with each block in the table sums up to one. It is shown that he sum of the diagonal in every block is larger than the sum of the off-diagonal, even when τ > 2. These results imply that stale pricing is widespread and persistent in the mutual fund industry.
B. Explanatory and predictive relations
In a two-step process, the first step estimates each fund's α, π, and ξ with a rolling window of three years (36 months). Each rolling moves observations one year (12 months) forward. The second step then applies both the pooled panel regression and the Fama-MacBeth method to examine the cross-sectional relation between performance, the dependent variable, and stale pricing, an explanatory variable. The controlling variables include log(TNA), expense ratio, age, portfolio turnover, income distributed, capital gains distributed, net flows, total loads, and the fund style. Particularly, since fund loads can impede opportunistic trading by imposing high transaction costs, an interactive variable of total loads and stale pricing is also included in the panel regression. All explanatory variables are studentized, and fund styles are controlled for with dummies.
(Insert table V here.) 
V. Robustness

A. Errors in variables
As shown in the previous section, stale pricing explains cross sectional differences in conventionally measured performance. The procedure for estimating the relation consists of two stages: estimation of both performance and stale pricing for each fund with time series data and regression of the estimators from the first stage on each other cross sectionally. As a result, the second stage cross sectional regression is likely to suffer an errors-in-variables problem. This section addresses this issue by calculating the bias caused by errors-in-variables problem and shows that the magnitude of the bias does not dramatically influence the results given in the previous section.
Whereas appendix A.8 provides a full outline of the problem and its solution, the two biases involved can be summarized as follows. 
C. Staleness in the indices
The estimation with the proposed model uses the S&P 500 index returns as benchmark returns, a favorable choice given that other benchmark returns, even style indices, can be stale. This assumption can be tested with a simplified version of the model that uses zero flows. The application of the simplified model to 12 portfolios-NYSE, AMEX, NASDAQ equally weighted indices, value, growth, small stock indices and the six Fama-French portfolios-shows that most of these portfolios are stale relative to the S&P 500 index.
9
VI. Conclusion
Stale pricing is prevalent in the mutual fund industry and impacts fund performance through two channels: a statistical bias and an arbitrage dilution. This paper introduces a model of performance evaluation that accounts for the stale prices and 9 Results are available from the author on request.
endogenous fund flows. Specifically, it differentiates true performance from observed performance and attributes the difference to these two effects. Compared to the true alpha, the observed alpha has a positive spurious bias that is small, but a negative dilution bias that is large and significant. Such decomposition is particularly interesting for performance attribution studies and applications. The structure of the proposed model also allows extension to time-variant stale pricing or to evaluate fund managers' timing ability.
A comparative component of the analysis shows that fund performance evaluated with conventional methods is negatively associated with stale pricing, which suggests that reducing stale pricing through fair-value pricing to impede arbitrages may not only protect long-term investors but also benefit portfolio managers directly.
Appendix:
A1: Decision of the timer and flows into the fund
A timer is a utility optimizer with a choice between cash and fund shares:
where x is the weight on fund shares in period t, and h is an exogenous benchmark preference parameter, R p is the return of fund shares, and R f is the return of cash. By setting the first-order condition of the utility function to zero, it can be simplified using Rubinstein's (1973) lemma:
where γ is the risk aversion parameter and r p is the excess return R p -R f . This calculation then gives the optimal weight:
From equations (1a) and (1b), the following can be derived:
E(r t *| I t-1 o ) =E[ ηr t-1 +(1-η)r t | I t-1 o ]= η r t-1 + (1-η) μ (A1.4)
Var(r t *| I t-1 o ) = var[ ηr t-1 +(1-η)r t | I t-
where r t-1 o is the observed return, r t-1 is the true return, and r t * is the return with zero flows. μ and σ 2 are the mean and variance of the true return, respectively, and η is the stale pricing parameter. The derivation of the conditional mean of r t * is based on the assumption that timers will know r t-1 once they have observed r t-1 o . This assumption is reasonable because timers can infer the parameter of stale pricing η given I t-1 o . For simplicity, it is also assumed that timers do not consider their own flow's impact on the realized return.
Substituting (A1.4) and (A1.5) into (A1.3), the timer's position in fund shares
Therefore, the position change at the end of time t-1 is
Denoting the timer's total assets as M, the arbitrage flow to the fund in time t is
Denoting λ= γ TNA / M and the long term flow component as a fraction of assets by C then yields the fund flows at the end of period t-1:
A2: Dilution impact of fund flows
Denoting the observed excess return of NAV with zero flows by r t * and the observed excess fund's NAV with flows by r t 0 ,
where P t is the observed price of the fund shares. Denoting the number of fund shares by
The essential problem of dilution comes from the investment time lag of the new money flows. That is, trading of shares is transacted at the NAV price at the end of the day, but the new money cannot be invested until the next day. Therefore,
TNA t =TNA t-1 (1+R t *)+CF t-1 (1+ R f ) (A2.4)
where R t * is the total return of the fund, the sum of the risk free rate and the fund's excess return r t * . CF t-1 , which is the amount of the money flow at the end of t-1, can also be denoted as a percentage of the total assets, f t-1 :
Therefore,
= (P t -P t-1 )/P t-1 -R f = (TNA t /N t )/P t-1 -1 -R f = [N t-1 P t-1 (1+r t *+ R f )+CF t-1 (1+ R f )] /[N t-1 P t-1 + CF t-1 ]-1-R f =[1 + r t * + R f + f t-1 (1+ R f )]/(1+ f t-1 ) -1-R f = r t * / (1 + f t-1 ) (A2.6)
which is equation (8) in the paper.
A3: System of the model.
The model consists of the following:
Where r t denotes the true excess return of the portfolio, and r mt the excess market return.
Both r t and r mt are i.i.d, and the error term ε t is independent of r mt . r i,t * is the observed excess return of the portfolio with zero flows, η is the weight on the lagged true return, and C t-1 is the long-term flows that occur at the end of period t-1. Furthermore, C t-1 is independent of r t-1 and follows an N(c, σ c ), i. and
Cov(r t o (1+f t-1 ), r m,t ) = E( r t o (1+f t-1 )r m,t ) -E( r t o (1+f t-1 )) E(r m,t ) = Cov(r t o r m,t , f t-1 ) + E(r t o , r m,t )E(1+f t-1 ) -E( r t o (1+f t-1 )) E(r m,t ) = Cov(r t o r m,t , f t-1 )+(1+c)[Cov(r t o , r m,t )+E(r t o ) E(r m,t )]-E( r t o (1+f t-1 )) E(r m,t ) = Cov(r t o r m,t , f t-1 )+(1+c)Cov(r t o , r m,t ) -E(r m,t )Cov(f t-1 , r t o ) (A4.3)
It should be noted that the last step uses (A4.2) and (A3.3); therefore, and its time series properties deduced using two related stochastic processes.
Cov(r t o , r m,t ) = [(1-η) Cov(r,r m ) -Cov(r t o r m,t, f t-1 ) + cov(f t-1 , r t o ) u m ]/(1+c) (A4.5) As a result, the measured performance is α o = E(r t o ) -Cov(r r t o ,r m,t ) u m /σ m 2 = E(r t ) -cov(f t-1 , r t o )]/(1+c) -[(1-η)Cov(r,r m ) -Cov(r t o r m,t, f t-1 ) +cov(f t-
Defining δ it and X it (k) as the following Bernoulli random variables,
δ it is an indicator of trading in period t:
δ it = 1 with probability1-π i (A6.1) = 0 with probability π i while X it (k) indicates trading in period t after not having traded in the past K periods:
It should be noted that δ it is implicitly assumed to be an independently and identically distributed random sequence for i = l, 2, . . . , N.
The observed return process R it o is given by the following stochastic process:
whose moments and comoments can be derived from the definition of X it (k):
For arbitrary i, t, and k,
, since both (1 -δ it ) and δ it are included in the product, and if l < n, it can be shown that the expectation reduces to (1 -π i ) 2 π i k+l to yield
Therefore, the moments of the observed return can be derived as follows:
A7: A model of stale pricing-smoothing index
In the smoothing index introduced by Getmansky, Lo, and Makorov (2004) for a thin trading scenario, the true return is governed by a one-factor linear model:
where f t, ε t are both i.i.d. However, the measured (observed) return is a weighted average of true returns in the past k periods:
The smoothing index is defined as the sum of the weights squared:
Smoothed prices vs. smoothed returns
Letting p t be the natural log of the fund's true net asset value per share (and assuming reinvestment of dividends), then its true return is
Due to smoothing, the measured price is
where the coefficient δt measures the extent of stale pricing during the month t.
Therefore, the measured return on a fund is
In a nondynamic stale pricing setting, the extent of stale pricing is assumed to be constant. Therefore, r t o = δr t-1 + (1-δ)r t , which is the same as a smoothed return approach.
A8: The statistical issue of errors-in-variables
Abstract of the issue
The first stage consists of two time series regressions in which estimates of the coefficients are obtained:
where Cov (x i , ε j ) = 0, i, j = 1, 2. In the second stage, the estimates of a 1 and a 2 are regressed on each other in cross section, while the true model is the following:
Assuming x 1 and x 2 are observed without errors, the following can be derived:
A is the attenuation bias in the traditional errors-in-variables problem in which only a 2 is observed with error; Φ is the bias caused by the correlated errors in a 1 and a 2. The issue now becomes one of calculating A and Φ, whose values are determined by Cov (ε 1 , ε 2 )
and Var(ε 2 ).
Necessary assumptions
Estimating the cross-sectional variance and covariance of ε 1 and ε 2 requires that the equations (A8.1) and (A8.1) be regressed simultaneously for all funds. However, this step is plausible only if N<<T, where N denotes total number of funds in the cross section and T denotes the number of period in the time series. In the sample used for this paper, N is over 7,000, while the maximum possible T is 360. Therefore, the cross-sectional relation (A8.4)-(A8.6) is assumed to be the same for all funds within the same style group, meaning that one fund can be selected from each group to form a system with 16
equations. This system can be estimated using the seemingly unrelated regression method and calculating A and Φ. Another complication arises from the functional form of the first-stage equations, in which stale pricing does not take a linear form. Therefore, another assumption that stale fund returns follow an AR(1) process is imposed to simplify the form.
Estimation
In this paper, the two time series regressions are as follows: 
The system (A8.13) is estimated using eight random funds, one from each style. This table presents the estimation results of the GMM system (equations 8a to 8h) at the style portfolio level for the 1991-2004 sample period. The style portfolio is equally weighted month by month with funds within that style group. Panel A presents the estimated parameters, including η, stale pricing, and λ, the product of Rubinstein risk aversion γ and the relative assets of the fund to the timer. Panel B presents the estimated performance and biases in annual percentage, with α being the true alpha; α o , the measured alpha; Δα 1 , the statistical bias; Δα 2 , the dilution of long-term flows; and Δα 3 , the dilution of arbitrage flows.
Table III Performance Evaluation Considering Stale Pricing and Endogenous flows-by Individual Fund
This table summarizes the estimated results of the GMM system (equations 8a to 8h) at the individual fund level for the 1991-2004 sample period. The system is first estimated for each fund, then the estimated true alpha, observed alpha, and the biases are summarized in annualized percentage. Panel A summarizes the estimates for each style group, although the maximum capital gain style group is missing because of the limited number of observations. Panel B shows the funds sorted into five quintiles according to their stale pricing, as well as the statistical differences between the highest and lowest quintiles. 
Table IV-b Persistence in Stale Pricing
For each year, funds are classified into H or L according to their stale pricing. This table presents the joint probability of a fund falling into the high or low category in year t and t + τ. Staleness, π, and ξ are from equations (10a) and (10b). For π, H means π > 0 and L means π = 0. For ξ, H means ξ ≥ 0.5 and L means ξ < 0.5. The GMM system (8a) to (8h) is estimated fund by fund, and their t-statistics are grouped and then plotted by style group. The four plots are for the net alpha, the spurious bias, the dilution of the long-term flows, and the dilution of the arbitrage flows.
The X-axis presents the fund style group. From 1-7, they are growth funds, other aggressive growth, income, growth and income, sector, small capital growth, timing.
The Y-axis presents the range of the t-values. From 1-8, they are t>2.36, 1.96<t<2.36, 0<t<1.96, 0<t<-1.96, -1.96<t<-2.36, t<-2.36.
The Z-axis presents the percentage of funds that fall into the range of the t-values for each style group.
